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Not only was Aristotle a mathematical logician but, as George Boger sees
it, a mathematical logician whose work has a particular resonance for the
modern logician. Boger sees this modern resonance in five features of
Aristotle’s work on logic: (1) Aristotle’s “logic”, says Boger “is taken as
part of epistemology; (2) syllogistic deduction is treated methodologically,
(3) rules of natural deduction are explicitly formulated, (4) the syllogistic
system is modeled to demonstrate logical relationships among its rules,
and (5) logical syntax is distinguished from semantics”.1
These are important claims. If true, they help make the case for Aristotle’s
“genius as a logician of considerable originality and insight”. I find myself
wholly in agreement with this assessment, notwithstanding reservations about
two of Boger’s five claims. I think that Boger is entirely right about propositions
(2), (3) and (4). I have doubts about (1) and (5), as well as about the paper’s
subtitle. Let me begin there. What is it to be a mathematical logician? Here is
Barwise on the point: “Mathematical logic is traditionally divided into four parts:
model theory, set theory, recursion theory and proof theory.”2 By Kleene’s
lights, “the study of mathematical logic begins properly only” in the theory of
computibility and decidability.3 Shoenfield sees things in much the same way
as Barwise. “The central topics of mathematical logic [...are...] proof theory,
model theory, recursion theory, axiomatic number theory, and set theory”.4
Even Church, whom Boger cites, has the same view of the subject, as witness
the chapter headings of volume one of Introduction to Mathematical Logic and
the tentative table of contents of volume two.5 Of these four or five “central
topics” one finds no trace in the Prior Analytics, except for the sort of proof
theory that a theory of natural deduction often is. But is this proof theory in the
modern sense of an exercise in logical syntax?
Boger finds that “Aristotle and modern logicians share the same notion that
establishing knowledge of logical consequence is central to the study of logic”
(2). Further, “the study of such an instrument is focused precisely on the formal
conditions of logical consequence” (2). Concerning syllogisms, Aristotle
“demonstrated which of these patterns have only valid argument instance” (3).
And “patterns with only valid instances [...are...] sullogismoi.” (3).
Logical consequence enters Aristotle’s account in three ways. It occurs as the
converse of the primitive notion of necessitation or entailment. It is the
converse of the defined relation of syllogistic implication. And it drives the nonsyllogistic perfection proofs of the metalogic in the Prior Analytics. In no case
is it discernible that consequence is an artefact of logical syntax. As the
converse of necessitation, it imbibes the overtly semantic character of that
relation. As the converse of syllogistic implication, it is a restriction of a core

semantic relation, even though some of the restrictions might be seen as
purely syntactic constraints. As the relation that drives the perfection proofs of
the Prior Analytics, it makes indispensable use of deduction rules which
embed the notion of syllogistic implication. I conclude, then, that in its
treatment of logical consequence there is no case to be made for a modern
syntax–semantics distinction in Aristotle’s logic.
In this regard it is useful to bear in mind that in no sense is Aristotle’s a logic
of validity. His principal target is the syllogism. Syllogisms are restrictions of
valid arguments. They are valid arguments satisfying further conditions. One
is that there be no idle premisses. Another is that conclusions not repeat a
premiss. A third is that syllogisms have no multiple conclusions (in the manner
of Gentzen, for example). These are weighty constraints. Jointly they provide
that the core theory of syllogisms is an intuitionistic, relevant, nonmonotonic
logic.6
Bearing on the question of how much of a syntaxicist Aristotle was in his
natural deduction theory is the extent to which he makes serious theoretical
use of the notion of logical form. Boger thinks it “worth noting...that Aristotle
employed, at least implicitly, the semantic principle of form”. “Indeed”, says
Boger, “we see that Aristotle developed an artificial language, although not
strictly a formal language, to help model his logic better to reveal its
properties. Although”, Boger points out, “it is stretching the point to say that
Aristotle approximated inventing an uninterpreted language, we might,
nevertheless, recognize a move in this direction”.(5)
I myself doubt it. It is true that Aristotle’s theory of syllogisms is tied to a
canonical language, but it is strictly a sublanguage of Greek, viz., the set of
categorical propositions. “Proposition” is a technical term for Aristotle. We
ourselves use the equivalent expression “categorical proposition”. No
proposition contains any expression which is not either a general term of
Greek, or a symbol for predicate negation (or term complementation) or a
quantifier expression, “All...are—” , “Some...are—” and “No...are—” (in which
the apparent copula is an undetachable part). What makes categorical Greek
Aristotle’s choice of canonical notation for logic is the thesis of propositional
simplification7 ,which asserts that anything statable in Greek is statable without
relevant loss in the language of [categorical] propositions. Thus the language
of the theory of syllogism is wholly without artifice. It is true that when he makes
general remarks about propositions and syllogisms that are always triples of
them, Aristotle often uses the device of what Quine calls dummy or schematic
letters. But, as Bolger points out, these aren’t variables. “We believe”, he
says, “that Aristotle took each letter to be a schematic letter, and not a logical
variable, in ways similar to W.O. [sic] Quine’s meaning of ‘a dummy to mark a
position’.” (Ft.nt. 21). So then not even in the language of metalogic do we find
variables.
This gives us two points to try to make something of. One is that in modern
terms a natural language argument’s logical form is its reconstruction in a

semi-interpreted artificial language. There is nothing in Aristotle answering to
any such conception of logical form. Then, too, on a modern understanding,
logical forms embed variables irreducibly. But, there are no variables in
Aristotle’s logic. Twice-over the suggestion fails that Aristotle has even an
implicit understanding of logical form, to say nothing of whether it does some of
the heavy lifting in his logic. To the extent that there is no notion of logical form
in Aristotle, and no notion of an artificial or uninterpreted canonical language, it
is difficult to make the case that his logic harbours anything like our distinction
between logical syntax and semantics.
What then of Boger’s claim that Aristotle’s logic exudes a modern cachet in so
far as it seems itself as part of epistemology? Here, too, there are two
questions to reflect upon. One is whether it is true that Aristotle sees his logic
as part of epistemology. The other is whether this is also how modern logic
sees itself. Let us proceed with these in reverse order. Epistemic logic itself
aside, how would we begin to take the measure of the claim that modern logic
is part of epistemology? It is true that Frege’s second order logic has an
epistemological motivation. Frege wanted to demonstrate the analyticity of
arithmetic. This is clearly a epistemological objective. He thought that he
could fulfill it by showing that number theory is reproducible without relevant
loss in a theory of pure sets embedded in a quantification theory of secondorder. Both these theories he took to be analytic, but there is little in Frege that
counts as a well-shaped case for this assumption. In like fashion,
constructionist logics are driven by a certain conception of the conditions under
which mathematical knowledge is possible for beings like us. But it is one
thing to have an epistemological motivation; it is another thing to be part of
epistemology. There is a way of approaching our question which holds out
some promise. Imagine that we are designing a course in epistemology. It is
easy to suppose that the syllabus might direct our students to writings
characteristic of the main positions in the theory of knowledge, both historically
and contemporaneously. We would expect to find referrals to correspondence
and coherence theories, to pragmatic theories, to internalism and externalism,
to naturalism and reliablism, to the problem of à priori knowledge, to the
nature of evidence and justification. But would we expect so much as a
sentence directing the student to a system of logic? I think not. By modern
standards, logic is not part of epistemology.8
If we pay attention to the Topics and Sophistical Refutations, we see that
Aristotle wanted logic to be the theoretical core of a wholly general theory of
argument. With Prior Analytics, the objective had narrowed; Aristotle sought a
theory of demonstration, although he deferred its development, such as it is, to
the Posterior Analytics. As conceived of by Aristotle, demonstrations embed
two epistemologically significant notions. One is the idea of first principles.
The other is the idea of certainty. However, what one does not find in the Prior
Analytics are theoretical accounts of these things.
Of first principles one learns little more than that they neither require nor admit
of demonstration. And of certainty, we learn little more than that

demonstrations preserve truth but not certainty. So I conclude that it is a
substantial overstatement to claim that Aristotle’s logic is part of epistemology.
So much for what divides Boger and me. As to the three remaining points, I
have nothing but support (and admiration). And it seems to me that these are
far and away the most important points, on which Aristotle’s reputation as a
logician of astonishing prescience securely rests.
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